ANALYSIS: Ukraine – The Story We Were Never Told

In Western media, the war in Ukraine is almost unanimously presented as an unprovoked Russian war of aggression, with Russia solely responsible for the violence and suffering. But is that really true?

It’s easy to be swept away by this simple narrative, especially when emotions take control and crucial nuances are left out. However, a conflict of this magnitude has deep roots, and understanding those roots is not the same as defending the war. I’m writing this analysis because I trust that most people are capable of thinking for themselves — as long as they are given access to multiple perspectives and more information. And because I firmly believe that all people have the right to live in peace — free from the cynical grip of great power politics.

The Historical Background – After the Cold War

When searching for the roots of the war in Ukraine, we must go back to the geopolitical power shift that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the early 1990s, Russian leaders received repeated assurances that NATO would not expand eastward if Moscow accepted the peaceful reunification of Germany. Then-U.S. Secretary of State James Baker is said to have assured Mikhail Gorbachev that NATO would not move “one inch” closer to Russia’s borders. This verbal understanding was never formalized in any treaty, but it was nevertheless perceived as an informal foundation for a new security order in Europe.

Despite these assurances, NATO began its eastward expansion in 1999, when Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic became members. By 2004, an additional seven Eastern European countries had joined the alliance, including the Baltic states. In the West, this was portrayed as a natural extension of the sphere of democracy and freedom, where sovereign nations freely chose their own path. For Russia, however, this was seen as a strategic betrayal — a gradual encirclement and an existential threat to Russian security.

This sense of encirclement has clear historical parallels. In much the same way that the United States responded with a blockade and a global crisis when the Soviet Union attempted to place missiles in Cuba in 1962, Russia perceived NATO’s expansion as a foreign military alliance gradually moving its bases and capabilities closer to Russian cities and strategic nuclear installations. Where the West saw sovereignty and freedom, Russia saw encirclement — a threat they believed endangered their very existence.

Ukraine Caught Between East and West

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Ukraine has been a key piece in the geopolitical chess game between East and West. With its long border with Russia and deep historical, economic, and cultural ties to Moscow, Ukraine occupied a unique position. At the same time, the country’s western regions had closer historical, economic, and cultural connections to Europe. This tension meant that, for decades, Ukrainian leaders attempted to strike a delicate balance — fostering cooperation with the West while maintaining pragmatic relations with Russia.

That balance collapsed in 2014. The United States and the European Union openly supported opposition forces in Ukraine, who sought to pull the country westward and out of Russia’s sphere of influence. The US-backed protests on Maidan Square, combined with President Viktor Yanukovych’s decision to reject an EU association agreement in favor of a deal with Russia, triggered a chain of events that ended with his flight from the country and a dramatic change of power in Kyiv.

The now-infamous leaked phone call between Victoria Nuland, then US Assistant Secretary of State, and US Ambassador Geoffrey Pyatt exposed how Washington was not merely observing events — it was actively orchestrating parts of the transition. In the call, Nuland specifically named the individuals the United States wanted to see in Ukraine’s new government — a remarkably candid glimpse into how Washington viewed Ukraine as a strategic asset in a larger geopolitical contest.

For Russia, this was a profound shock. Ukraine, long seen by Moscow as both a cultural kin and a strategic buffer, was now on the verge of becoming a pro-Western stronghold — with an open path to NATO membership and potential US military presence. From the Kremlin’s perspective, this was an unacceptable development.

NATO’s Role – From Partner to Driving Force

After 2014, Ukraine developed increasingly close ties with NATO. Although the country remained formally outside the alliance, it became deeply integrated into Western defense structures through arms deliveries, intelligence cooperation, and joint military exercises. NATO actively participated in the training of Ukrainian forces, and Jens Stoltenberg regularly reaffirmed that NATO stood firmly behind Ukraine’s sovereignty — all while leaving the door to eventual NATO membership open.

For Russia, this crossed a red line. From the Kremlin’s perspective, Ukraine was no longer a neutral buffer state, but an active piece in NATO’s broader strategy to weaken Russia’s influence and strategic position. This perception was reinforced when, in 2023, Stoltenberg himself confirmed that NATO had been present in Ukraine since 2014 and that the alliance had spent years preparing Ukrainian forces for precisely the type of war that erupted in 2022.

Reflection: Can a war truly be called “unprovoked” when a military alliance has spent years strengthening and training a neighboring country’s armed forces, with the explicit goal of integrating it into its own security framework?

A War of Aggression – or a Response to NATO’s Strategy?

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was quickly branded as an unprovoked act of aggression by Western media, but this characterization ignores the broader security context leading up to the war. As early as December 2021, Russia submitted a concrete draft security agreement to both the United States and NATO. The proposal called for Ukraine to remain neutral and for NATO forces to withdraw from Eastern Europe — demands that were rejected outright without serious negotiations.

From the Russian perspective, the invasion was not primarily a war of conquest, but an attempt to halt what they saw as the slow, deliberate integration of Ukraine into NATO — a process they viewed as an existential threat to Russian national security. To the Kremlin, the situation was not unlike how the United States would likely respond if Russia or China began establishing military bases in Mexico or Canada.

Jens Stoltenberg himself confirmed in 2023 that:

"President Putin declared in the autumn of 2021, and actually sent a draft treaty that they wanted NATO to sign, to promise no more NATO enlargement. That was what he sent us. And was a pre-condition for not invade Ukraine. Of course we didn't sign that. "The opposite happened. He wanted us to sign that promise, never to enlarge NATO. He wanted us to remove our military infrastructure in all Allies that have joined NATO since 1997, meaning half of NATO, all the Central and Eastern Europe, we should remove NATO from that part of our Alliance, introducing some kind of B, or second class membership. We rejected that. "So he went to war to prevent NATO, more NATO, close to his borders. He has got the exact opposite. He has got more NATO presence in eastern part of the Alliance and he has also seen that Finland has already joined the Alliance and Sweden will soon be a full member. "This is this is good for the Nordic countries. It's good for Finland and Sweden. And it's also good for NATO. And it demonstrates that when President Putin invaded a European country to prevent more NATO, he's getting the exact opposite."

Reflection: When a great power perceives its security as threatened for decades, where is the line between self-defense and aggression?

RAND’s Strategy to Weaken Russia

The RAND Corporation, one of the most influential think tanks in the United States when it comes to security policy, had already produced a comprehensive report in 2019 titled Extending Russia: Competing from Advantageous Ground. This report analyzes how the US and its allies could exploit Russia’s economic and military vulnerabilities, and it outlines specific measures designed to impose strategic costs on Russia. Arming Ukraine, increasing NATO’s presence in Eastern Europe, and imposing economic sanctions are all mentioned as key strategic tools.

Reflection: Is it possible to understand Russia’s actions without viewing them through the lens of this long-term strategy? Where is the line between strategic pressure and provocation?

The Peace Negotiations That Were Halted

In the spring of 2022, it briefly seemed possible that the war could come to an early end. During negotiations in Istanbul, the parties were reportedly close to reaching an agreement that would guarantee Ukrainian neutrality, no NATO membership, and security guarantees from several major powers. On March 29, 2022, Ukraine’s own presidential office publicly released its official proposal for security guarantees.

However, this process came to an abrupt halt after British Prime Minister Boris Johnson visited Kyiv in April 2022. According to both Ukrainian and Turkish sources, Johnson conveyed that the West was not interested in an early peace deal, but rather saw strategic value in a prolonged conflict to weaken Russia. This was later confirmed by Turkey’s then-Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu.

Reflection: What does it mean for Ukraine’s independence when crucial peace processes are derailed due to external pressure? Who ultimately benefits from a prolonged war?

Trump and the Policy Shift in 2025

With Donald Trump’s return to the White House in 2025, U.S. policy has taken a dramatic turn. Trump has announced that the United States will no longer act as a guarantor of prolonged wars. He has also made it clear that he intends to push for peace — even if it requires painful compromises for Ukraine.

This shift is part of a broader break with the global interventionism that has defined U.S. foreign policy since the 1990s. Under Trump’s leadership, the focus will shift to securing America’s borders, strengthening the domestic economy, and rebuilding national industry — while the so-called “deep state,” consisting of security bureaucrats, think tanks, and the arms industry, will see its influence dramatically reduced.

Reflection: Will this policy shift lead to lasting peace in Ukraine — or will it leave the country isolated and weakened in the face of a powerful neighbor?

Ukraine – the Pawn Left Behind

Ukraine, which was promised Western support for “as long as it takes,” has in reality been used as a tool to weaken Russia. Now, as the U.S. withdraws, Ukraine is left with hundreds of thousands dead, a shattered economy, and significant territorial losses. The Western security guarantees offered in 2022 have proven to be worth little when the interests of the great powers shift.

Reflection: What responsibility does the West bear for cleaning up the consequences of its own strategy? Can Ukraine ever achieve genuine independence as long as the country is used as a pawn in the games of others?

Is There a Simple Solution?

When we view the war in Ukraine through the lens of this broader history, it becomes clear that there are no easy answers or heroic narratives. The war is brutal, illegal, and tragic – but it is also the product of decades of great power rivalry, broken promises, and strategic miscalculations. If we truly want peace, we must be willing to see the whole picture – and understand that lasting stability can only be built on mutual respect and genuine security guarantees for all parties involved.

Reflection: Can peace be achieved before both the West and Russia recognize each other’s legitimate security concerns? Or is Ukraine doomed to remain a battlefield for the ambitions of others?

Sources

Historical Background: NATO Expansion and Promises to Russia

🔗 https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2017-12-12/nato-expansion-what-gorbachev-heard-western-leaders-early

🔗 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/12/10/nato-refuses-to-backtrack-on-ukraine-georgia-membership-promise
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The US and the 2014 Maidan Coup

🔗 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26079957

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NATO and Ukraine’s Integration

🔗 https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_37750.htm

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🔗 https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_214041.htm

Negotiations in 2022 and Proposed Agreement

🔗 https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/na-peregovorah-iz-rosiyeyu-ukrayinska-delegaciya-oficijno-pr-73933

🔗 https://www.ft.com/content/7b341e46-d375-4817-be67-802b7fa77ef1

🔗 https://static01.nyt.com/newsgraphics/documenttools/a456d6dd8e27e830/e279a252-full.pdf

Boris Johnsons part

🔗 https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/diplomacy/some-nato-allies-want-longer-war-for-weaker-russia-fm-cavusoglu
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Miscalculation: An Autopsy of NATO's Failed Strategy for a Long War

Jens Stoltenberg (NATO) explains that Russia attacked to stop NATO (2023)

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Stephen F. Cohen: NATO expansion and Russia (2010)

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RAND Corporation and the Strategy to Weaken Russia

🔗 https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB10014.html

Trump’s Policy Shift and Halt in Military Aid

🔗 https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/trump-halts-all-us-military-aid-ukraine-white-house-official-says-2025-03-04

🔗 https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c9deq4ypx57o

Ukraine – Economically and Militarily Weakened

🔗 https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ukraine

Bonus (The Ukraine War Explained in 2 Minutes)

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